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In light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions,1 some may think that environmental cit-
izens suits were destined to be eliminated.
Using standing to whittle away at the founda-
tion of citizen suit provisions, the Court has
relied upon injury-in-fact, redressability, and
causation to preclude review of potentially
meritorious claims.2 By developing such strict
standing requirements, the Court limited the
public's ability to utilize citizen suits as an
enforcement mechanism.
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,3 standing
intertwined with the doctrine of mootness to
produce an interesting and compelling case.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court's decision
may have reversed this downward trend and
reinforced the use of the citizen suit as an
important tool of environmental enforcement.
While the decision was well received in envi-
ronmental circles, the question remains
whether it will prove to be as beneficial as
many hope it will be.
This note discusses the decline and possi-
ble resurrection of the environmental citizen
suit provision. Section one outlines the origins
of the citizen suit provision. Section two
explores the decisions that characterize the
decline of environmental citizen suit enforce-
ment. Section three reviews the Supreme
Court's opinion in Laidlaw.4 Finally, section four
discusses Laidlaw's implications for the future
of environmental citizen suits.
The Laidlaw Decision:
Shield or Sword?
By Melanie A. Anbarci
 Melanie A. Anbarci is originally from the East Coast, but
has lived in California for several years.  Prior to law school she
had a career in structured finance.  Ms. Anbarci is interested in
sustainable conservation and is currently working at the Nature
Conservancy in the Asia/Pacific Program.
1. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
(“Lujan II”); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)
(“Lujan I”).
2.  See Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83; Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555; Lujan I, 497
U.S. 871.
3.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
4.  Id.
I. The Origins of Environmental Citizen
Suit Provisions
Environmental citizen suit provisions orig-
inated in the Clean Air Act of 1970 ("CAA").5
Congress realized that truly effective enforce-
ment of the environmental regulations
depends on the efforts of private citizen attor-
neys general.6 As one commentator explained
To rely on the existing bipolar institu-
tions for zealous application of new
standards and procedures was to ask
too much of institutional self-interest
and good-ol'-boy human nature . . . .
Citizen outsiders who understood the
new paradigm and were willing to take
on the burdens of volunteer pluralism
were a structural necessity if reform
was to be brought into the system over
the passive or active resistance of the
old insiders . . . . [I]f citizens did not
enforce the law, no one would.7
The CAA granted citizens the ability to
force the regulated industries to comply with
the statute's provisions by allowing them to
sue directly for injunctive relief.8 Under the
statute, citizens were also able to require the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to
perform the mandatory duties outlined in the
statute.9 By 1990, citizens were able to bring
suit against the regulated industries to impose
civil penalties.10 Today, most environmental
statutes administered by the EPA contain sim-
ilar provisions.11
The legislative history of the CAA discloses
that Congress included the citizen suit provi-
sion so the public could seek the vigorous
enforcement action intended by the statute
even if the government failed to exercise its
enforcement responsibility.12 After several
years of private enforcement action, Congress
reiterated its strong support for environmental
citizen suits: "Citizen suits are a proven
enforcement tool. They operate as Congress
intended — to both spur and . . . supplement .
. . government enforcement actions. They have
deterred violators and achieved significant
compliance gains."13 Because of the realities of
enforcement at the federal level, the EPA and
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") support the
use of citizen suits, which significantly aug-
ment federal government enforcement
actions.14
The legislative history of the CAA reflects
the difficulty of achieving balance between
providing a mechanism to encourage govern-
ment enforcement and overloading courts with
litigation.15 In response to this tension,
Congress developed various compromises,
such as requiring prior notice of suit, barring
suit when there is prior government enforce-
ment in progress and permitting successful
plaintiffs and defendants to potentially claim
attorneys fees.16 Due to the large quantity of
legislative history in the CAA and the similari-
ty of other environmental citizen suit provi-
sions, the CAA is often used to interpret other
environmental statutes.17
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5.  Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control
Laws: The Citizen Suit Provisions, 2 A.L.I.-A.B.A. ENVTL. LITIG. 303, 306
(1999). 
6.  Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift
of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 981, 1006 (1994).
7.  Id. at 1007.
8.  Miller, supra note 5.
9.  Id.
10.  Id.
11.  Id.; see also Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.S. § 1540
(2000).
12. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N 3668, 3730.
13.  S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985).
14.  OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB.
NO. 22E-2000, ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990'S PROJECT:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ANALYTICAL WORKGROUPS 5-47 to 5-48
(1991).
15.  See id.
16.  See id.
17.  See id.; see also Envtl. Def. Fund v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 672
F.2d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (using CAA to interpret Toxic
Substances Control Act); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 62 (1987) (discussing con-
nection between the citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts).
II. The Declining Viability of Citizen Suit
Provisions
A. The Use of Standing to Diminish the
Effectiveness of Citizen Suit Provisions
Before 1990 standing was only a minor fac-
tor in environmental citizen suit litigation. For
many years following the Court's 1972 ruling in
Sierra Club v. Morton,18 standing was leniently
granted to plaintiffs who by their activities and
conduct exhibited a special interest in the aes-
thetic, conservational, and recreational
aspects of a site.19 However, in 1990, the Court,
and Justice Scalia in particular, began to focus
on standing as a means to limit citizen suit
plaintiffs' access to the courts.20 In Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation,21 the Court made it
more difficult to meet the injury-in-fact prong
of standing by holding that plaintiffs had to
use the precise lands threatened by the chal-
lenged action, not just nearby lands.22 Next, in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife23, the Court raised the
standing bar again by requiring concrete,
rather than speculative, injuries to establish
injury in fact.24 But, the Court had yet to erect
the biggest hurdle to citizen suit standing —
the redressability component of standing and
the effect it had on civil penalties often sought
by citizen suit plaintiffs.
B. Problems Presented by the
Redressability Component of Standing
Most environmental statutes allow citizens
to bring suit against persons who are "alleged
to be in violation."25 In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,26 the defendant had
ceased violations prior to the suit being filed.27
Nevertheless, the district court found the
defendant liable for more than 600 days in vio-
lation of its National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit.28 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
established that "citizens could not bring suit
under the Clean Water Act for 'wholly past' vio-
lations."29
The Court held that the statute's language
limited citizen suits to cases in which the
plaintiff made a good faith allegation of a vio-
lation that is continuing or likely to recur.30 The
Court interpreted the statute to require the
plaintiff prove that the defendant was still in
violation at the time the complaint was filed.31
Therefore, citizens could not bring a suit for
sporadic violations or for a systemic violation if
the defendant remedied the cause of the prob-
lem before the case was filed.32
Because of the similarities between the
Clean Water Act and other environmental
statutes, the Court's interpretation in Gwaltney
limited the scope of environmental private
enforcement actions in general.33 Congress'
amendment to the Clean Air Act in 1990, allow-
ing citizens to bring suit for repeated past vio-
lations, may have indicated its disagreement
with the Gwaltney result, at least as a matter of
policy.34 However, Congress has not made sim-
ilar changes in other environmental citizen suit
provisions to reflect this perceive disapproval.35
Furthermore, although Gwaltney was a
statutory decision, Justice Scalia's concurrence
hinted at potential constitutional ramifica-
tions.36 He reasoned that when a violation has
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18.  405 U.S. 727 (1972).
19.  See id. at 734-36; see, e.g., United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669
(1973); Humane Soc’y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Save
Our Wetlands Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1983); No Gwen
Alliance Inc. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1983); Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Rabin County Chamber of Commerce Inc., 698
F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
20.  John D. Echeverria, Standing up for the Environment Justices:
Should Welcome Green Groups Into Court, LEGALTIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, at
2.
21.  497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
22.  Id. at 886-89.
23.  504 U.S. 555 (1992).
24.  Id. at 578.
25.  Miller, supra note 5, at 307.
26.  484 U.S. 49 (1987).
27.  Id. at 54-55.
28.  Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
611 F. Supp. 1542, 1555 (E.D. Va. 1985).
29.  Craig N. Johnston, 1998 - The Year in Review, 29 ENVTL. L.
69, 69 (1999).
30.  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
31.  Id. at 56-63. 
32.  Johnston, supra note 29, at 70. 
33.  Id.
34.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (a)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
35.  Id.
36.  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 67-71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
been cured before the filing of a law suit,
injury-in-fact ceased to exist so as to deprive a
plaintiff of standing, as well as of personal and
subject matter jurisdiction.37 Justice Scalia con-
firmed this implication in his opinion for Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.38
In Steel Co., after failing to file reports
required under the Emergency Planning and
Right to Know Act ("EPCRA")39 for seven years,
the defendant came into compliance prior to
filing of the complaint by Citizens for a Better
Environment ("CBE").40 The Seventh Circuit
determined that the EPCRA permitted citizen
suits for wholly past violations, unlike the CWA
in Gwaltney.41 However, the Supreme Court
reversed on constitutional grounds.42
The Court found there was no "case or con-
troversy" under Article III of the Constitution.43
Since the defendant had complied with the Act
before the suit was brought the redressability
component of standing was lacking.44 The
Court found that the declaratory relief sought
by CBE was useless because the defendant had
come into compliance and, therefore, no con-
troversy existed over whether Steel Company
violated EPCRA.45 More importantly, because
the plaintiff's request for was for penalties
payable to the Treasury instead of the plaintiff,
the Court considered it no more than "vindica-
tion of the rule of law" and mere "psychic satis-
faction," thus not likely to redress any cogniz-
able injury.46 The Court reasoned that the
penalties were sought by CBE not to remedy
any injury suffered, but instead,to vindicate the
faithful execution of the EPCRA.47 As such, the
plaintiff's request was simply a generalized
grievance not cognizable by the law.48
Although Justice Stevens agreed with the
result because he interpreted the statute to
preclude citizen suits for wholly past viola-
tions, he disagreed with the majority's consti-
tutional analysis.49 In his concurrence he
argued that the deterrent effect of a penalty
should satisfy the redressability requirement:
When one private party is injured by
another, the injury can be redressed in
at least two ways: by awarding com-
pensatory damages or by imposing a
sanction on the wrongdoer that will
minimize the risk that the harm-caus-
ing conduct will be repeated. Thus, in
some cases a tort is redressed by an
award of punitive damages; even when
such damages are payable to the sov-
ereign, they provide a form of redress
for the individual as well.50
Justice Stevens supported his view by argu-
ing that the Framers would have agreed that
these actions were constitutional because his-
tory shows that private persons were histori-
cally allowed to prosecute criminal cases in
both England and the United States.51
The Steel Co. majority rejected this argu-
ment because they reasoned that it would
eliminate the redressability requirement, stat-
ing that:
By the mere bringing of his suit, every
plaintiff demonstrates his belief that a
favorable judgment will make him hap-
pier. But although a suitor may derive
great comfort and joy from the fact that
the United States Treasury is not
cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just
deserts [sic], or that the nation's laws
are faithfully enforced, that psychic
satisfaction is not an acceptable Article
III remedy because it does not redress
a cognizable Article III injury. Relief
that does not remedy the injury suf-
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37.  Id. at 70.
38.  523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
39.  42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994). 
40.  Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1241
(7th Cir. 1996).
41.  Id. at 1242. 
42.  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109. 
43.  Id. at 102-09. 
44.  Id. at 105-09. 
45.  Id. at 106.
46.  Id. at 106-07.
47.  Id.
48.  Id.
49.  Id. at 112-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
50.  Id. at 127. 
51.  Id. at 127-28. 
fered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into
federal court; that is the very essence
of the redressability requirement.52
One commentator remarked that the Court
effectively constitutionalized the Gwaltney doc-
trine by finding that claims for civil penalties
did not by themselves provide redressability
for standing.53 The majority's decision meant
that Congress could not solve the Gwaltney
problem simply by stating its intent that citi-
zens be able to bring suit for wholly past viola-
tions.54 A plaintiff would only be able to bring
suit for wholly past violations in combination
with other claims for relief that satisfied the
redressability component.55 The question
remained as to what would happen in a suit
where the defendant came into compliance
after the filing of the complaint.
C. Complications Presented by the
Mootness Doctrine
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, the
Court articulated the principle that mootness
is just "'the doctrine of standing set in a time
frame: The requisite personal interest that
must exist at the commencement of litigation
(standing) must continue throughout its exis-
tence (mootness).'"56 In that case, an Arizona
civil servant sought an injunction against
enforcement of an amendment to the state's
constitution making English the state's official
language on the grounds that it deprived her of
freedom of speech in other languages while
conducting the state's business.57 The plaintiff
prevailed at trial and then left state employ-
ment.58 In the subsequent appeal, although the
case was reversed on other grounds, the Court
indicated that because the plaintiff no longer
had a direct stake in the outcome of the case it
should have been dismissed as moot.59
Courts have found that a case is not moot,
however, if the issues presented are "live" or if
the parties retain a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome.60 The courts retain the power
to hear and determine a case even if the defen-
dant voluntarily ceases the allegedly illegal
conduct.61 The courts devised this rule to
ensure that challenged actions would not
escape review just because they were voluntar-
ily ceased during litigation.62 There is an excep-
tion to the general rule that the voluntary ces-
sation of allegedly illegal conduct does not
render a case moot where "(1) it can be said
with assurance that there is no reasonable
expectation . . . that the alleged violation will
recur . . . and (2) interim relief or events have
completely and irrevocably eradicated the
effects of the alleged violation."63 To find that a
case has become moot merely because a
defendant claims to have ceased the chal-
lenged conduct would give defendants a signif-
icant advantage. Therefore, the burden on a
defendant who attempts to demonstrate moot-
ness is a heavy one.64
The mootness doctrine and its voluntary
cessation exception add to the potential prob-
lems for environmental citizen suits involving
defendants coming into compliance after com-
mencement of suits. When combined with the
Steel Co. holding that redressability cannot be
satisfied by penalties payable to the Treasury,
this doctrine could result in a constitutional
obstacle that precludes courts from hearing
claims for civil penalties if the core causes of
the violation have been eliminated.65 These
cases ultimately could create a defense for
environmental defendants who prolong litiga-
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52.  Id. at 107 (citations omitted). 
53.  Johnston, supra note 29, at 76. 
54.  Id.
55.  Id.
56.  Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68
n.22 (1997).
57.  Id. at 48-51.
58.  Id. at 59-60.
59.  Id. at 67-71.
60.  See Knight v. Mills, 836 F.2d 659, 670 (1st Cir. 1987). 
61.  United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953);
Nunez-Soto v. Alvarado, 956 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1992); Boston
Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Edgar, 787 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1986). 
62.  Knight, 836 F.2d at 670.
63.  County of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
64.  W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632. 
65.  Johnston, supra note 29, at 77. 
66.  See, e.g., Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 20 F.
Supp. 2d 263 (D.N.H. 1998).
tion until they can achieve compliance volun-
tarily to deprive the plaintiffs of standing or to
render the dispute moot. Furthermore, in some
cases, success on one claim could result in fail-
ure on another because an injunction could
render civil penalties moot.66
III. Laidlaw —-Beneficial or Burdensome?
In Laidlaw, Friends of the Earth ("FOE") filed
a complaint pursuant to the citizen suit provi-
sion of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("FWPCA") against Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc. ("Laidlaw") for dumping an
excessive amount of mercury into the Tyger
River.67 FOE sought declaratory and injunctive
relief as well as the imposition of civil penal-
ties.68 Although, the district court imposed a
penalty of $405,800, it denied declaratory and
injunctive relief because it found the violations
had not harmed the environment and Laidlaw
had been in substantial compliance since the
initial action was filed.69 FOE filed an appeal,
arguing that the court abused its discretion in
issuing inadequate penalties.70
In between the district court's decision and
FOE's appeal, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Steel Co..71 As a result, the Fourth
Circuit concluded on appeal that since Laidlaw
had come into compliance, FOE had lost its
standing because the civil penalty payable to
the government would not redress its injury.72
The court stated that all three elements of
redressability must be met throughout every
state of review, not only when the complaint is
filed.73 Thus, by combining the doctrine of
mootness with the redressability component
of standing, the court set the stage for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari both
to resolve a circuit split and to untangle the
confusion surrounding application of the doc-
trine of mootness and the issue of redressabil-
ity.74 FOE asked the Court to distinguish Steel
Co. on the ground that if violations are ongoing
at the time of filing, an assessment of civil
penalties does redress the plaintiff's injuries.75
In addition, FOE argued that the standard for
determining a suit's mootness is different and
more flexible than the standard for determin-
ing standing at the outset of litigation.76
A majority of the justices agreed.77 After
concluding that the Fourth Circuit erred as to
mootness, the Court could have simply
remanded at that stage of analysis.78 However,
the majority decided to discuss the issue of
redressability and the doctrine of mootness in
order to distinguish their respective applica-
tions.79 The Court noted that because the
Fourth Circuit had determined that the case
had become moot, it did not decide whether
FOE had initial standing.80
Thus, the Court began a standing analysis
and concluded that because the relevant injury
is to the plaintiff and not the environment,
FOE met the injury-in-fact test.81 The Court
noted that the district court found the affi-
davits and testimony of FOE's members assert-
ing their reasonable concerns about Laidlaw's
discharges had established injury-in-fact
because it directly affected their recreational,
aesthetic and economic interests.82 The Court
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67.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 600-01, 610 (D.S.C. 1997).
68.  Id. at 591. 
69.  Id. at 610-12.
70.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 1999).  FOE did not appeal the
denial of injunctive or declaratory relief.
71.  Id. (argued March 5, 1998 and decided July 16, 1998);
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (decid-
ed March 4, 1998). 
72.  Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07 (reasoning that because FOE
had not appealed the denial of injunctive relief, the only poten-
tial relief, civil penalties payable to the U.S. Treasury, would not
redress their injury).
73.  Id. at 306. 
74.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 179-80 (2000).
75.  Brief for Petitioner at 24-35, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167  (No.
98-822).
76.  Id. at 23. 
77.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167.  The Court's decision was 7-2, with
no justices concurring only in the outcome.
78.  Id. at 173. 
79.  Id. at 180.
80.  Id.
81.  Id. at 181.
82.  Id. at 184.
found it sufficient that the plaintiff's members
perceived health and environmental threats
that persuaded them not to use the river.83
The Court also found that these assertions
were more than mere general averments and
conclusory allegations found inadequate in
Lujan I; the assertions were specific statements
regarding use of the same resource.84 Although
FOE's statements were conditional — "that
they would use the nearby North Tyger River
for recreation if Laidlaw were not discharging
pollutants into it" — they were found to be
more concrete than the "'some day' intentions
to visit endangered species" that were held
inadequate in Lujan II.85
Justice Scalia, argued in his dissent that
the allegations were vague and, in light of the
District Court's determination of no harm to
the environment, made the injury-in-fact
requirement a sham.86 His dissent noted that
the Court did not require specific proof that the
discharges were hurting the plaintiff.87 Justice
Scalia further complained that the result was
too lenient a standard because it could be met
by anyone living near an offending plant.88
While this relaxation of the injury-in-fact
requirement was itself quite remarkable, envi-
ronmental groups were even more pleased by
the Court's ruling on redressability. The Court
found that when a plaintiff is injured by illegal
conduct, a sanction that halts the illegal con-
duct and prevents it from recurring satisfies the
redressability requirement of standing.89 The
Court held that civil penalties can fit that
description, reasoning that because such
penalties encourage defendants to stop cur-
rent violations and may deter future ones, they
provide redress to plaintiffs injured or threat-
ened with injury as a result the illegal activity.90
The Court took care to distinguish Steel Co. by
noting that it did not address "standing to seek
penalties for violations that are ongoing at the
time of the complaint and that could continue
into the future if undeterred."91
Thus, the effort to do away with public
penalties for private wrongs was derailed by
the majority's ruling.92 In his dissent Scalia
argued that the majority's novel theory that
public penalties can redress anticipated pri-
vate wrongs comes close to making the
redressability requirement vanish.93 He
claimed that the result of the decision gives
private interests the power to enforce public
civil penalties.94
Next, the Court reiterated that just because
a defendant voluntarily ceases a challenged
practice does not mean the federal court is
deprived of its power to rule on the legality of
the practice.95 In order to claim mootness,
Laidlaw was required to show that it was
"absolutely clear" that the court could not rea-
sonably expect the allegedly illegal conduct to
recur.96 The Court was cognizant of the fact that
while the district court denied injunctive relief,
it neither concluded that there was no possi-
bility of future violations nor that deterrence
was unnecessary.97 To the contrary, as the Court
observed, the district court actually based the
award of civil penalties on its determination
that there was a need for deterrence.98
The Court stated that Laidlaw's permit
compliance or the closure of the facility might
moot the case, but only if Laidlaw made it
absolutely clear that violations could not rea-
sonably be expected to recur.99 The Court rec-
ognized the fact that Laidlaw retained its water
pollution permit.100 Because the prospect of
future violations was a disputed factual matter
149
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
Winter 2001 The Laidlaw Decision: Shield or Sword?
83.  Id.
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
86.  Id. at 198.  (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87.  Id.
88.  Id.
89.  Id. at 185-86.
90.  Id. at 186.
91.  Id. at 187.
92.  Id. at 205. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93.  Id. at 202.
94.  Id. at 209.
95.  Id. at 189.
96.  Id. (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate
Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
97.  Id. at 193.
98.  Id.
99.  Id.
100.  Id. 193-94.
that had not been aired in the lower courts, the
Court remanded the case for further considera-
tion of this matter.101
Only Justice Stevens expanded on this
important aspect of the problem.102 He argued
that the case would not become moot on
remand even if Laidlaw made it absolutely
clear that they posed no threat of future viola-
tions.103 He reasoned that because the district
court entered a valid judgment for civil penal-
ties, it should not be permissible for the post-
judgment conduct of a defendant retroactively
to invalidate that judgment.104 He further
argued that while a record of voluntary post-
judgment compliance might moot a claim for
injunctive relief, it should not be allowed to
invalidate a valid money judgment.105 He point-
ed out that the only case regarding damages
cited by the majority in its discussion of moot-
ness made it clear that the "inability to obtain
injunctive relief would have no impact on the
damages claim."106 Justice Stevens strongly
emphasized that there is no precedent to sup-
port the argument that post-complaint compli-
ance that might affect claims for injunctive or
declaratory relief could also retroactively
vacate a valid money judgment.107
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argued
that when it is clear that the plaintiff will no
longer be injured by the actions of the defen-
dant, a claim for civil penalties is moot.108 He
distinguished civil penalties that are assessed
to deter potential future harm to the plaintiff,
from money damages that are assessed to
compensate for harm caused by past con-
duct.109 Thus, if a threat of future harm no
longer exists, there is not need for deter-
rence.110 And, therefore, if a defendant provides
sufficient proof to meet the requirements of
voluntary cessation, even on appeal, then civil
penalties could be vacated as moot.111
IV. Future Implications of Laidlaw
For environmental citizen suit proponents,
the most beneficial aspects of the Laidlaw deci-
sion are the relaxed injury-in-fact and redress-
ability standards pronounced by the Court. It is
now possible for citizen groups to prevent seri-
ous deterioration of the environment by bring-
ing suit at earlier stages. Under this ruling, it is
no longer necessary to wait until the environ-
ment shows the effects of a violation. As
Justice Scalia points out, anyone living near or
using a threatened resource could claim fear of
health or environmental threats in order to sat-
isfy the injury-in-fact component of standing.112
No specific proof of harm to the plaintiff is
required. Reasonable concern for the recre-
ational or aesthetic qualities of a resource,
when combined with requisite proximity or
potential usage, will permit environmental
groups to take action earlier than under the
previous injury-in-fact standard. By taking
action earlier, violators will suffer the conse-
quences of their actions sooner and, thus, will
have less incentive to delay compliance. In
addition, this ruling has added another benefi-
cial aspect to the fight against environmental
deterioration: environmental groups can also
threaten action sooner and a threat of suit by
itself can be a significant deterrent.
The Court's recognition of civil penalties as
a form of redress for injury is of equal impor-
tance. By noting that Steel Co. was not a case
with a need for deterrence, the Court cleared
up much confusion about the role of civil
penalties in the environmental enforcement
scheme. In Steel Co., the Court held that penal-
ties payable to the Treasury instead of the
plaintiff did not satisfy redressability because
payment to the Treasury only provided the
plaintiff with psychic satisfaction that the laws
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110.  Id.
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were being properly executed.113 In Laidlaw,
however, the majority of the Court changed
course and agreed with Justice Stevens' dissent
in Steel Co., raising the level of civil penalties
from mere psychic satisfaction to sufficient
redress for cognizable injury. The majority rec-
ognized that civil penalties encourage defen-
dants to stop current violations and may deter
future violations.
This determination provides closure for the
standing issue in cases where injunction or
voluntary compliance remedies the violation
during trial. The Court has confirmed that
standing, once established, cannot be lost.
Now, plaintiffs can confidently pursue civil
penalties as the deterrent they were intended
to be. Defendants will have to come into com-
pliance before a suit is filed or face the full
potential consequences at trial. This require-
ment provides environmental groups with a
useful tool in negotiations where a violator
would have difficulty coming into compliance
before suit can be filed. Better improvements
can be negotiated and faster time frames
agreed upon; the end result could be better
than one devised by the court.
Although Laidlaw is a fundamental shift in
the Court's approach to standing, in environ-
mental cases , the Court left a major loophole
for the regulated industry. The problem that
remains for many environmental citizen suit
enforcement actions is the mootness issue
which was remanded for further consideration.
The doctrine of mootness, and in particular
voluntary cessation, may become the new tool
for keeping environmental citizen suits out of
the courts. It may simply be too costly for citi-
zen groups to continue to bring suits if volun-
tary compliance on appeal eliminates any
chance of recovering attorney's fees. In addi-
tion, citizen groups would have less incentive
to go through the effort of a trial if they were
unable to rely on the result because it ends up
being only a temporary cessation
The Fourth Circuit must decide whether
Laidlaw has satisfied the voluntary cessation
doctrine. Laidlaw must prove there is no rea-
sonable expectation that the violation could
recur. This proof will be difficult to show if
Laidlaw still holds a permit to discharge. In
addition, Laidlaw must prove that interim
events or relief have completely and irrevoca-
bly eradicated the effects of the violation.
Where injury is the loss of use of a river and
apprehension about the effects of pollution, it
is unclear how Laidlaw would accomplish this
by simply closing its doors. Next, the court
must determine whether voluntary cessation,
after a valid money judgment has been
entered, should vacate that judgment. Even if
the court does find that Laidlaw has met the
voluntary cessation doctrine, it should not per-
mit such a finding to moot a valid money judg-
ment.
If the Fourth Circuit rules that Laidlaw's
voluntary compliance moots the claim for civil
penalties, citizen suit proponents face the fact
that all the effort and expense of trial may be
for naught, at least financially. Because the
Court focused on the ongoing nature of the
unlawful conduct, it seems that a defendant
need only prove voluntary cessation at some
point during the appeals process and, thereby
effectively moot a claim for civil penalties and
attorney's fees. Thus, stopping a violator from
damaging the environment could end up ruin-
ing any chance for civil penalties or collecting
attorney's fees. This is a serious consequence
for accomplishing what is usually at least one
of the goals of the suit — stopping the pollu-
tion. Although, environmental proponents
would be successful in stopping the pollution,
at least temporarily, efforts may be reduced
because the risk of not recovering fees would
be cost prohibitive.
To get the benefit of the mootness doctrine
under this voluntary cessation approach, the
defendant has a high burden to prove that the
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violations will not recur.114 Although this bur-
den is high, it is not impossible.115 Simply com-
ing into full compliance during the course of a
long legal battle still provides defendants with
an avenue of escape. In a world where time is
money, this bonus to the industry for delaying
compliance would work to the disadvantage of
environmental citizen groups and the environ-
ment. Even if the violation stops, it is at the
expense of the environment and citizen
groups.
The consequences of this delay factor can
wreak havoc on the environment. Violators
faced with hefty fines for violating their permits
need only reduce emissions to levels that will
not violate their permits. Before installing the
appropriate equipment, the amount of pollu-
tion released into the environment can be dev-
astating. Then, once the equipment is installed
the company escapes liability for the damage
because it is no longer violating its permit.
Hence, the claim for civil penalties is moot and
the company may have actually saved money
by stalling.
The damage to citizen group plaintiffs can
be just as severe. Citizen suit plaintiffs can face
prolonged legal battles only to find that the
claim and any potential recovery of attorney's
fees have become moot because the defendant
came into compliance. Defendants will seek to
prolong the legal battle in an effort to increase
costs for citizens groups in hopes that they will
be forced to drop the suit. If the suit is not dis-
missed , the defendant always has the option
to remedy the violation before judgment and
has gained significant time to do so. However,
the citizen group will be left with depleted
resources.
Another problem with ruling that voluntary
cessation moots a valid money judgment is the
impact on resource allocation. If a violator is
able to comply late in a legal battle and escape
penalties, it is not required to bear the costs of
polluting the environment. In addition, other
environmentally sound companies have no
incentive to continue to comply. If a company
knows that it can be financially beneficial to
neglect environmental compliance, what
incentive exists to produce environmentally
sound products and services?
To many large companies, the delay tactic
means money in the bank. If they simply delay
compliance and invest the money at the last
possible moment to avoid penalties, the
resource allocation process is distorted
because prices do not validly reflect the cost of
producing. The demand for the products or
services at the reduced rate may increase,
thereby encouraging continued noncompli-
ance. If the products included the costs of envi-
ronmental compliance they would reflect the
actual cost of production. Under those circum-
stances, demand may stabilize, decrease or
even disappear as people begin to choose to
forego products that are too expensive to pro-
duce because of the environmental costs.
If Laidlaw had come into compliance dur-
ing the course of the initial trial, it may have
been a different story; unfortunately, a claim
for penalties may be mooted during a trial. But,
after a valid money judgment has been entered
by a court, compliance should not be an option
to avoid penalties — it should be required in
addition to penalties. Otherwise, the appeal
process becomes more than a review of the
prior proceeding. The court would need to
make factual determinations of whether the
violator has come into compliance since the
judgment. Essentially, the defendant would get
a second chance to reform and escape penal-
ties.
A valid judgment for civil penalties should
not be voidable simply because the violator is
no longer capable of continuing to violate the
law. The absurdity of this position is evident
from other claims that could be argued to be
moot for the same reason. For example, under
this theory, speeding tickets could be over-
turned simply because the driver later loses his
or her license. Professionals, such as doctors
152
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
114.  See id.
115.  See, e.g., Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir.
1998) (proving voluntary cessation by compliance with American
with Disabilities Act); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough County
Aviation Auth., 162 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 1998) (proving voluntary
cessation by change in airport policy); First Colony Life Ins. Co. v.
LFC Resolution Payment Fund, Ltd., 83 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (proving voluntary cessation by stipulation to refrain from
challenged conduct); Kiedos v. Apfel, 45 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D. Mass.
1999) (proving voluntary cessation by change of Social Security
Administration policy).
Melanie A. Anbarci Volume 7, Number 2
and lawyers, could escape penalties because
they were prohibited from continuing to prac-
tice their profession after losing their license
because of a violation. Stockbrokers prohibited
from working in the financial industry due to
insider trading could escape the penalty por-
tion of their judgment. The purpose of civil
penalties is to penalize the violation of the law.
Once that determination has been made,
unless it is erroneous, the judgment must
stand in order to have any deterrent effect.
While Justice Scalia is correct to note that
civil penalties deter future violations, there are
several varieties of deterrence. Deterrence
does not have to be specific to the individual
or to the violation. In addition to deterring the
defendant from continuing to violate the law,
civil penalties deter the defendant from violat-
ing the law at some point in the future. By
bearing the expense of breaking the law, the
defendant is sent the message that crime does
not pay. In addition, others are dissuaded from
violations by witnessing the imposition of civil
penalties as a consequence of breaking the
law. By applying negative consequences for
violations, the system communicates the mes-
sage that ultimately one must pay for one's
crimes.
The Fourth Circuit can refer to relevant
case law on each side of this issue. In Gwaltney,
the Court noted that violations sufficient at the
commencement of a suit could become moot if
the defendant came into compliance before a
trial on the merits.116 However, several courts
found that a case did not become moot even
when the defendant proved later compliance if
civil penalties were also permitted and
sought.117 In reaching this conclusion, the
courts relied on the fact that, under the Clean
Water Act, civil penalties attach as of the date
a permit violation occurs.118 In addition, the
Court hinted at its direction concerning a
defendant coming into compliance after a valid
money judgment in Laidlaw. In a footnote, the
majority indicated its preference for nonva-
catur by providing examples of prior decisions
where mootness from a voluntary act did not
justify vacatur of a judgment under review.
If the Fourth Circuit follows the other cir-
cuits119 and concludes that under Gwaltney vol-
untary cessation after filing of the complaint
can only moot the injunctive portion of the
case,120 environmental proponents can breath a
sigh of relief. However, more crucial is the
question of whether a valid money judgment
can be mooted by voluntary compliance after
the entry of the judgment. I have outlined vari-
ous reasons why the Fourth Circuit should not
vacate a valid money judgment just because a
defendant has voluntarily complied after the
trial is over. Since the issue is still ongoing,121
the future of citizen suits, in this respect, is
uncertain. For now, at least it may be easier to
get in the door of the courthouse because of
the more relaxed standards for injury-in-fact
and redressability set out in Laidlaw.122
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